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Abstract: Cause-consequence analysis is one of the best tools available for a 
comprehensive reliability study. The cause-consequence diagram (CCD) method, like fault 
tree analysis, represents the failure logic of the system, but in addition the CCD also 
identifies the complete set of consequences following a given initiating event. Despite the 
clear appeal of this approach to engineers the CCD method has its drawbacks, e.g. for 
many industrial systems the diagram obtained will be very large and its final form 
dependant upon the analyst constructing it. If the diagram construction and its analysis 
could be automated it would reduce the potential for human error and increase the 
usefulness of the method. 
 
Hence in this paper the development of an algorithm for automated cause-consequence 
diagram construction is described. The algorithm builds on methods developed previously 
for fault tree construction, such as topology diagrams describing how components are 
linked together in a system, component decision tables, used to model component 
behaviour, etc. Using this information a set of rules have been developed which enable 
automatic construction of the CCD. Once constructed the diagram can be quantified to give 
exact system reliability. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach the algorithm is 
applied to a simple example. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In his study, Nielsen [1] developed the cause-consequence diagram as a graphical tool for 
the analysis and description of relevant accidents in complex process plants. The method is 
based on a combination of standard reliability techniques. The cause diagram is the 
conventional fault tree used to describe all causes of an undesired event. The consequence 
diagram is an event-sequential diagram (decision-tree diagram) describing the alternative 
failure sequences that an abnormal event leads to if one or more of the accident 
preventing/limiting provisions fail. By using a combination of these reliability methods, 
the logical connections between independent accident causes and accident consequences 
can be established [2]. The main symbol in a CCD is a decision box which contains a 
component/subsystem condition. It is an identical representation of the YES/NO branches 
in an event tree. Following the YES/NO branches of the decision box the diagram is 
developed until it terminates in consequence boxes.  
 
The CCD method has advantageous features in both its representation of a systems failure 
logic and its subsequent quantification. However traditional cause-consequence analysis is 
based on manual construction of the diagram. This requires a detailed knowledge of the 
system, plus experience and practice in understanding the failure modes of the components 
within the system and their effects. The construction is time-consuming and expensive, 
moreover, it can be a source of human errors. A faster and error free analysis can be 
performed if the CCD is automatically generated by computer from the system description 
[2].  
 
Past work on automating reliability techniques has concentrated on fault tree analysis. As a 
result, a variety of methods for computerized fault tree synthesis have been developed and 
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published. The most successful are based on the diagraph method [3]  and the decision 
table method [4]. Lapp and Powers introduced a systematic algorithm to deal with control 
loops based on their digraph method [3]. The authors developed general operators 
whenever variables on the control loops were encountered in the digraph. A diagraph 
explicitly describes the relationships between process variables. The fault tree was then 
constructed by examining the cause and effect relationships indicated on the diagraph. 
Salem et al. [4] proposed a method to construct fault trees for general complex systems and 
implemented an automatic construction method called CAT (Computer Aided Tree). The 
components were modelled by decision tables describing the relations between the 
component inputs, component operation and failure modes, and the component outputs. A 
system topology was used to describe the connections between components. The features 
of diagraph and decision table methods were combined [5] in a new method for automating 
fault tree construction appropriate to modelling two-state and continuously variable safety 
systems. Since decision tables were used to model components behaviour no restriction 
was placed on the number of discrete states used to represent components behaviour. The 
gains, showing how changes in input parameters affect the output parameters, were 
incorporated into these tables enabling the method to deal with control loops. 
 
In this paper previous methods applied to fault tree construction are extended to automate 
the construction of the CCD. 
 
2 GENERAL ALGORITHM 
In the following sections an algorithm will be described that accepts a description of the 
system under construction and generates a CCD which can be quantified in a 
straightforward manner. The automatic generation is based on the following steps: 
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1. Initially information about the system required by the algorithm is given; 
2. The CCD is then automatically constructed by applying the developed algorithm; 
3. The CCD is reduced to its most efficient form by excluding irrelevant decision 
boxes; 
4. Fault trees describing the failure of subsystems are constructed by employing the 
decision table method [4, 5]; 
5. The cause-consequence diagram is then used to analyse the system considered. 
These five steps will be described in more detail in the following sections, 2.1 to 2.5. 
 
2.1 Algorithm requirements 
In order for the construction algorithm to be implemented detailed information about the 
system being considered must be given. This information is broken down into: component 
models, system topology diagram, and failure rate data for the components.  
 
The component models used in this work are in the form of decision tables [4]. For each 
component its state is combined with all possible inputs from the components with which it 
is linked, to give outputs which are passed on to other components within the system. The 
construction of such tables and their use in other automated procedures is described in 
detail by Salem et al. [4].  
 
The system topology diagram details how the components inputs and outputs are linked 
together within the system.  
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The failure rate data includes a description of the failure modes of the components as well 
as their rate of failure. It is used in the construction of fault trees and their quantification, 
and hence the final CCD quantification.  
 
For some systems it is also necessary to specify initial states for the components.  
The algorithm also requires that an initiating event is identified. At the current stage of the 
algorithm development this event is given by the user. It depends upon the system under 
construction and is generally a component, with an associated function, which initiates the 
system. This is the first event considered in the algorithm.  
 
In order to ensure that the CCD construction process completes and the algorithm does not 
continually consider components that are linked together, stopping criteria must also be 
identified. These indicate at which point the algorithm has reached a consequence and 
hence that path is completed. 
 
A computer program implementing the construction algorithm is currently being 
developed. The end user will input the components within the system and how they are 
linked. The program will then draw upon a library of decision tables and construct the 
CCD diagram.  
 
2.2 Construction algorithm 
A set of steps have been developed to construct the consequence diagram. For ease of 
programming, systems have been classified into those that have circuits and those that 
don’t. Where a circuit is defined as a path containing a power supply which starts and ends 
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at the same component and with all components passing current.  In the following 
subsections the steps for the two different cases have been summarised. 
 
2.2.1 Systems with circuits 
1. Initially, from the topology diagram, all possible paths through the system are 
traced. A path is obtained by tracing the output from a component to the input of 
the next until a component is repeated. From the list of possible paths the circuits 
are identified.   
 
2. The algorithm proceeds by considering the component associated with the initiating 
event. The circuits are searched to determine which contain this component and 
then are considered in turn.  
 
3. The decision table for the component being considered is investigated and for the 
given inputs the possible rows in the table identified. These are considered in turn. 
If the decision table includes functions these are checked to see if they can be 
applied. A decision box is created relating to the output in the row of the decision 
table being considered. The question in the decision box will relate to current/no 
current in the circuit under consideration. 
 
4. The YES branch of the decision box is followed which determines the output in 
each component in the considered circuit. A check is made to see if any of the 
stopping criteria have been reached. If so the algorithm jumps to step 7. If not a 
check is made to see if the circuit contains any components with external outputs 
which have not previously been considered and if so these are considered next. A 
 7
components output is external if it is linked to a component which is not included 
in the circuit being considered. The decision table for that component is 
investigated and the relevant rows, taking into account previous decision boxes, 
established. A decision box is then added related to the external output. The YES 
branch of this box is then followed. If the circuit contains no components with 
external output that haven’t already been considered the algorithm moves straight 
on to step 5. 
 
5. Once all components with external output have been considered the next circuit 
identified previously is considered in the same way by applying steps 3 and 4, until 
all circuits have been considered. If the decision table for the initial component 
contains functions which have not yet been applied then all circuits containing the 
component must be considered before these functions can be applied. 
 
6. Once all circuits have been considered the decision table for the component under 
consideration is checked to see if any further functions can be applied. If so a 
decision box may be added related to the function. If not, the components with 
external outputs are reconsidered and the components to which their external output 
are linked identified. The circuits within which these components lie are then 
considered and steps 3, 4 and 5 applied. This continues until a stopping criteria is 
satisfied. 
 
7. Once a stopping criteria is satisfied a consequence box is created showing the state 
of the system. A check is then made to determine if all decision boxes in the 
 8
diagram have been developed completely. If so the diagram is complete, if not the 
algorithm moves onto the next step. 
 
8. Backtrack to the last decision box and develop the NO branch in the same manner. 
This is continued until all decision boxes have been developed on both the YES and 
NO branches until a consequence box is reached.  
 
2.2.2 Systems without circuits 
1. Initially, using the topology diagram and the component decision tables, the order 
in which components and their output are considered is determined. Briefly this is 
achieved by starting with the component associated with the initiating event and 
considering all its outputs in turn. The components to which each of these outputs 
are connected are then considered and their outputs taken in turn, etc. 
 
2. The algorithm proceeds by considering the first output of the component associated 
with the initiating event identified in step 1.  
 
3. The components decision table is used to determine the possible values for the 
output and a decision box is added to the figure related to that value. 
 
4. The YES branch is developed. A check is made to see if the stopping criteria have 
been satisfied. If so the algorithm jumps to step 7.  
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5. A check is made to see if any functions for the component under consideration can 
be applied. If so a decision box may be added if necessary related to the function 
and the algorithm returns to step 4.  
 
6. The next component output identified in step 1 is now considered and the algorithm 
returns to step 3. 
 
7. Once a stopping criteria is satisfied a consequence box is created showing the state 
of the system. A check is then made to determine if all decision boxes in the 
diagram have been developed completely. If so the diagram is complete, if not the 
algorithm moves onto the next step. 
 
8. Backtrack to the last decision box and develop the NO branch in the same manner. 
This is continued until all decision boxes have been developed on both the YES and 
NO branches until a consequence box is reached.  
 
The main steps for the diagram construction are represented in a flowchart for the 2 cases 
in Figures 1a and b, where the numbers in bold relate to the steps described above. 
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Fig. 1a Flowchart showing the main steps in the diagram construction for systems 
containing circuits 
  No  Yes
  No
  No
 Yes 
 Yes
 1. Identify all possible paths through 
the system starting with the 
component associated with the 
Initiating Event 
1. From the set of paths determine the 
subset of circuits.  
System 
Topology 
Models of the 
Components 
Initiating Event 
Stopping Criteria & 
Consequence 
Scenarios 
System inputs 
2. Consider the component associated 
with the initiating event 
4. Develop the YES branch 
4. Is the stopping 
criteria  
satisfied?
7. Add consequence box 
related to the output 
Reduce the CCD 
diagram 
Construct Fault 
Trees 
7. Are all 
decision boxes 
developed?
8. Back track to previous 
decision box and trace NO 
branch 
 6. Can any function 
for the component be 
applied? 
6. The components with 
external outputs are 
reconsidered in turn.  
 Yes
Add decision box related to 
function if applicable 
2. Determine which circuits contain the 
component and consider them in turn. 
3. Determine the possible outputs of the 
component 
3. Create a decision box questioning 
whether there is current/no current in 
circuit 
4. These components are 
considered in turn and the 
external output investigated. 
If the external output is 
unknown a decision box is 
added questioning its state. 
 Yes 
  No
  No
 5. Have all circuits 
containing 
component been 
considered
Consider next circuit identified 6. Determine the components to 
which the external 
output are linked 
and consider them 
next 
 4. Are there components  
in the circuit with external 
output which haven’t been 
considered yet? 
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Fig. 1b Flowchart showing the main steps in the diagram construction for systems without 
circuits 
 
 
In applying the steps outlined in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 certain rules have to be applied. 
The most commonly used ones are given below: 
  No
  No
 Yes 
 Yes
1. Starting with the component 
associated with the initiating event 
determine the order in which the 
components and their outputs will be 
considered.  
System 
Topology 
Models of the 
Components 
Initiating Event 
Stopping Criteria & 
Consequence 
Scenarios 
System inputs 
2. Consider the first output of the 
component associated with the initiating 
event identified in step 1. 
3. Investigate and determine the 
potential outputs of the component 
3. Create a decision box related to the 
output of the component 
4. Develop the YES branch 
4. Is the 
stopping criteria 
satisfied? 
7. Add consequence box related 
to the output 
Reduce the CCD 
diagram 
Construct Fault 
Trees 
7. Are all 
decision boxes 
developed?
8. Back track to previous 
decision box and trace NO 
  No  5. Can any function 
for the component  be 
applied? 
6. Consider next output or 
component identified in step 1. 
 Yes
5. Add decision box 
related to the function if 
applicable 
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1 First of all trace the YES branches of the decision boxes until a consequence box is 
reached. Then back track to the last decision box and develop the NO branch in the 
same way. Continue until the diagram is completed. 
 
2 The output of the component being considered is obtained by taking the rows in its 
decision table in turn with the “don’t matter” cells considered last. 
 
If the given inputs in a row of the decision table for the component considered, result in 
outputs which match previous ones considered, then the next row of the table is 
investigated. Otherwise consider the next function for this component.  
3 If the component being considered has functions added to its decision table and it 
exists in more than one circuit and conditions exist such that a function is satisfied 
and hence applied. Then all the circuits in which the component exists must be 
considered before any further functions can be applied. 
 
2.3 Diagram reduction 
In this stage of the diagram generation it is reduced to its most efficient form. This is 
achieved by inspecting each decision box in the CCD. A decision box is deemed irrelevant 
if the boxes attached to its NO and YES branches are identical and their consequences are 
the same. Since the removal of the irrelevant box has no effect on the end result, it is 
excluded and the next decision box or consequence box in the path put in its place [6]. 
Figure 2 shows an example of an irrelevant decision box, box 2. In this example the state 
of component B is irrelevant as whichever path is taken from box 2 the outcome is the 
same. Since the state of component B is irrelevant, decision box 2 is removed, and then 
decision box 3 is encountered in its place and is renumbered.   
 13
 
 
Fig. 2 Cause-consequence diagram reduction 
 
If no further redundancies exist the cause-consequence diagram is deemed minimal [6].  
 
2.4 Development of the fault trees 
If a decision box is governed not by a component but by a sub-system then the probability 
of failure will be obtained via a fault tree [7]. These fault trees are produced automatically 
using fault tree construction methods developed previously [4, 5]. 
 
2.5 Analysis 
Having constructed the CCD it can be used to analyse the system under consideration.  
A qualitative analysis will produce the list of causes for each outcome condition. These are 
established by considering each decision box on the path to a particular outcome and 
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listing the components failure or success as indicated by the exit path from the decision 
box.  
 
A quantitative analysis will produce the probability of each system outcome. As the 
algorithm ensures that the probabilities of the decision boxes of the CCD are independent 
these are obtained by simply multiplying the probabilities of the component events in the 
branch leading to that consequence. The probability for each consequence for a system is 
then determined by summing the probability of each path leading to that consequence, as 
stated by Nielsen [1]. 
 
In order to demonstrate the construction and analysis process described above it is applied 
to a simple system. 
 
3 AUTOMATED CCD CONSTRUCTION EXAMPLE 
The cause-consequence diagram construction algorithm is now described in detail in 
relation to the pressure tank system illustrated in Figure 3. Initially the system is 
considered to be in a dormant state and thus de-energised. The switch (S), the relay 
contacts (C1 and C4) are all open, the timer (TIM) and pressure switch (PRS) contacts (C2 
and C3) are closed. Depressing S provides power to the coil of relay 1 (R1) which results 
in the closure of contacts, C1. R1 self latches when S opens when released, and power is 
also supplied to relay 2 (R2) resulting in contacts, C4, closing which starts the motor (M) 
and hence pump (P). It is assumed that the tank (T) takes 30 minutes to fill and once the 
pressure threshold is reached the pressure switch opens contacts, C3, de-energising R2 
which results in the removal of power from the pump motor. After a period of time the 
tank becomes empty and the pressure switch closes C3 which energises R2. The pump 
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restarts and the filling process commences again. A safety feature – the timer – is included 
in case the pressure switch fails to open. When the contacts, C1, are closed power is 
supplied to the timer relay, this initiates a clock. If the clock registers 30 minutes of 
continuous pumping to the tank then the timer contacts, C2, are opened which results in a 
break in the circuit to R1 and system shutdown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Pressure tank system 
 
 
3.1 Automated CCD construction 
Following the automated algorithm described the following steps are taken: 
 
i) Algorithm requirements: A topology diagram, showing how the components are linked 
together, is constructed, see Figure 4. In the diagram components are represented by 
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rectangles. In order to construct this diagram it was necessary to use junctions J1-J4. These 
are parts of the system where information is sent in, or reduced from, more than one 
direction. For example, at J1 information from both C1 and S is returned to PS1. These 
junctions are labelled next to their position. For electrical systems, it is considered, that the 
current flows from right to left this is indicated by the arrows in the figure. 
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Fig. 4 Topology diagram for the pressure tank system 
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The data for the components in the system is shown in Table 1. The failure data 
shown in the table are not real data but have been assumed here in order to 
demonstrate the technique described.  
 
Table 1 Failure modes and failure data for the components 
Component Failure  
mode 
Description Failure  
rate, λ  
Inspection 
interval, θ  
Mean time 
to repair, τ  
Switch (S) S_FC Switch failed closed 
 
1E-5 4368.0 36.0 
S_FO Switch failed open 
 
8.698E-4 – – 
Relay 1 (R1) R1_FC Relay 1 fails closed 
 
2.3E-7 4368.0 36.0 
R1_FO Relay 1 fails open 
 
2.3E-7 – – 
Relay 2 (R2) R2_FC Relay 2 fails closed 
 
2.3E-7 – – 
R2_FO Relay 2 fails open 
 
2.3E-7 – – 
Timer (TIM) TIM_FC Timer fails closed 
 
1E-5 4368.0 36.0 
TIM_FO Timer fails open 
 
1E-5 – – 
Pressure switch 
(PRS) 
PRS_FC Pressure switch  
fails closed 
1E-5 – – 
PRS_FO Pressure switch 
fails open 
1E-3 – – 
Fuse (FS) FS_F Fuse fails broken 
 
1E-3 – – 
Power supply 1 
(PS1) 
PS1_F No power  1E-3 – – 
Power supply 2 
(PS2) 
PS2_F No power  1E-3 – – 
Motor (M) M_F Motor fails broken 
 
1E-4 – – 
Pump (P) P_F Pump fails broken 
 
1E-4 – – 
Tank (T) T_F Tank fails broken 
 
1E-7 – – 
 
All the failure modes of the components in Table 1 are revealed except switch, relay 1 
and timer, failed closed.  
 
There are eleven decision tables relevant to the components in the example. These are 
shown in Tables 2 to 12. As an example of how these decision tables are constructed 
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consider the switch, see Table 2. Two failure modes have been considered for this 
component, failed open (FO) and failed closed (FC) as described in Table 1. From the 
topology diagram, Figure 4, it can be seen that S has two inputs, IN1, – the manual 
closing or automatic opening and IN2 the current from junction J4. IN1 has two 
possible states, closed (CL) and open (OP), and IN2 has current (C) or no current 
(NC). It has one output connected to IN2 of J1. Table 2 considers all possible 
combinations of inputs from IN1 and IN2 and all possible states of S and the effects 
these will have on the output to the J1. The sign “–” in the inputs and state columns of 
the decision tables indicates the “don’t matter” condition, which means that the 
specified input and component state will result in the specified output regardless of 
the value of the variable.  
 
For example, for S, there are two causes of current in the output, Table 2, these are: 
1. Input 1 is closed (IN1 = CL), current in input 2 (IN2 = C) and switch working 
(W), row 1. 
2. Current in input 2 (IN2 = C) and the switch failed closed (FC), row 5. 
In order to model the fact that the switch only closes momentarily in this system, 
functions have to be added to the decision table, see Table 2. The first function states 
that: 
1. If the switch is closed, working and the system has just started then the 
component remains closed and the time changes to 0.1 min. This models the 
switch remaining closed for 0.1 minute. The second function states that: 
2. If the switch is closed, working and the time is 0.1 min then the switch opens 
(IN1 => OP). This models the switch opening again after the time 0.1 minute 
has elapsed. 
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The functions are investigated in turn and their effects investigated. Functions are 
added to decision tables in order to describe any time dependent behaviour. Some 
functions introduce process deviations while others may change the input or output 
variables of a certain component.  
 
The other tables are constructed in a similar manner. 
 
Table 2 Decision table for switch 
 IN1 IN2 State OUT 
1 CL C W C 
2 OP – W NC 
3 – NC – NC 
4 – – FO NC 
5 – C FC C 
(1) S: If (IN1 = CL ∩  State = W ∩  Time = 0), 
     then IN1 = CL ∩  Time = 0.1 min; 
(2) S: If (IN1 = CL ∩  State = W ∩  Time = 0.1 min),  
      then IN1 => OP. 
 
Table 3 Decision table for relay 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W CL C 
2 NC W OP NC 
3 – FO OP – 
4 – FC CL – 
5 C – – C 
6 NC – – NC 
 
Table 4 Decision table for timer 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W CL C 
2 NC W CL NC 
3 – FC CL – 
4 – FO OP – 
5 C – – C 
6 NC – – NC 
        (1) TIM: If (IN = C ∩  State = W ∩  Time > 30 min),  
         then OUT1 => OP. 
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Table 5 Decision table for power supply 
 IN State OUT 
1 C W C 
2 – F NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 6 Decision table for fuse 
 IN State OUT 
1 C W C 
2 – F NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 7 Decision table for motor 
 IN State OUT1 OUT2 
1 C W ON C 
2 C F OFF C 
3 NC – OFF NC 
 
Table 8 Decision table for pump 
 IN State OUT 
1 ON W MF 
2 – F NMF 
3 OFF – NMF 
 
Table 9 Decision table for tank 
 IN State OUT 
1 MF W LPR 
2 – F LPR 
3 NMF – LPR 
(1) T: If (IN = MF ∩  State = W ∩  ( )min30min0 << Time ), 
     then OUT = LPR ∩  Time => (= 30 min); 
(2) T: If (IN = MF ∩  State = W ∩  Time = 30 min), 
     then OUT => HPR ∩  Time => (> 30 min); 
(3) T: If (IN = MF ∩  State = W ∩  Time > 30 min),  
     then OUT => VHPR. 
 
Table 10 Decision table for pressure switch 
 IN State OUT 
1 LPR W CL 
2 HPR W OP 
3 – FC CL 
5 – FO OP 
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Table 11 Decision table for contacts 
 IN1 IN2 OUT 
1 C CL C 
2 – OP NC 
3 NC – NC 
 
Table 12 Decision table for junctions 
 IN1 IN2 OUT1 OUT2 
1 C – C  
2 – C C  
3 NC NC NC  
4 C  C C 
5 NC  NC NC 
 
Where MF is mass flow, NMF is no mass flow, LPR is low pressure, HPR is high 
pressure and VHPR is very high pressure. ON and OFF denotes motor turned on and 
off respectively. The blank cells in the decision table for the junctions 1-4, Table 12, 
are irrelevant. In this paper high pressure means the threshold pressure reached when 
the tank is full. 
 
The initial conditions are that the switch and the relay contacts are open, timer and the 
pressure switch contacts are closed, i.e. 
S: IN1 = OP; 
R1: OUT1 = OP; 
R2: OUT1 = OP; 
TIM: OUT1 = CL; 
PRS: OUT = CL; 
T: OUT = LPR. 
 
In order to start the algorithm the initiating component and its function must be 
identified. The system considered is initiated when the switch closes. Hence the 
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initiating component is S with input 1 close (CL). In the notation adopted here this is 
written as: S: IN1 => CL and the time is set to zero (Time = 0). 
 
The stopping criteria in this case is that all the components in the system which have 
the capability to change their outputs have been considered. There are three possible 
outcomes to consider, when the tank indicates: 
• low pressure, i.e. the tank is empty, T: (OUT => LPR); 
• high pressure, i.e. the system operates normally or safe, T: (OUT => HPR); 
• very high pressure, the failure of some components leads to continuous 
pumping to the tank and hence its overpressure, i.e. T: (OUT => VHPR). 
 
ii) Construction algorithm: The CCD is constructed in the manner described in section 
2.2.1 and shown schematically in Figure 1a. 
 
Step 1:  Five circuits are identified in this example: 
1) {PS1, J2, C2, R1, J3, J4, C1, J1, PS1}; 
2) {PS1, J2, C2, R1, J3, J4, S, J1, PS1};  
3) {PS1, J2, C3, TIM, R2, J3, J4, C1, J1, PS1};  
4) {PS1, J2, C3, TIM, R2, J3, J4, S, J1, PS1};  
5) {PS2, F, C4, M, PS2}.  
 
Step 2: Since the switch is the initiating component, circuits 2 and 4 are considered as 
they contain S. Circuit 2 will be considered first. 
 
 24
Step 3: The initiating event is IN1 = CL. Considering the decision table for S, Table 
2, the algorithm searches for the rows whose first column for the input IN1 could take 
the value CL. These are rows 1, 3, 4 and 5. Considering these in order, row 1 is 
considered first, hence IN2 = C, State = W, OUT = C. Considering the functions 
attached to Table 2 it can be seen that function 1 is now satisfied and hence Time = 
0.1 min. After a function has been applied all the circuits must be considered before 
applying any further functions in turn, see rule 4. Decision box 1 is created related to 
the output OUT = C, see Figure 5a: “Is C in Circuit 2?” i.e. does the switch close and 
the power supply work?  
 
Step 4: The YES branch of the decision boxes is followed which results in current in 
the 2nd circuit. In this case considering the components within circuit 2 there is 
current in: 
- OUT of J1 (since C is in IN2 to J1 and IN1 is unknown, row 2 in Table 12 
describes the situation); 
- OUT of PS1 (row 1 in Table 5); 
- OUT1 of J2 (row 4 in Table 12); 
- OUT of C2 (row 1 in Table 11); 
- OUT2 of R1 (rows 1, 3-5 in Table 3); 
- OUT of J3 (row 1 in Table 12) and  
- OUT2 of J4 (row 4 in Table 12). 
The stopping criteria has not been satisfied so a check is made of the components in 
circuit 2 to determine whether any have external output. One such component is 
identified, R1, as the output from this component is linked to an input of C1 which is 
in circuits 1 and 3 but not 2. 
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The decision table for the relay, Table 3, is now considered. As it has been assumed 
that there is current in the circuit 2, (YES branch of decision box 1, Figure 5a), four 
rows of the table satisfy this (rows 1, 3-5). However, in the 4th row the relay is in a 
failed closed state, which contradicts the initial assumption that the relay is opened 
and hence this row is not relevant. The column related to the external output is 
investigated. Considering rows 1, 3 and 5 in Table 3 in turn, row 1 is considered first. 
In this case OUT1 = CL. Hence the decision box 2 is added which contains the 
question “Is R1: OUT1 = CL?”, see Figure 5a. 
 
Step 5: As there are no more components with external output in circuit 2 any other 
circuits containing S must be considered. Hence circuit 4 is investigated next. A 
decision box should be created asking whether there is current, or no current in the 
circuit. However from the path taken (YES branch of decision box 1) and the initial 
condition for PRS it is known that there is current in circuit 4 and hence this box is 
unnecessary. Hence any components within the 4th circuit with external output are 
considered. There are two such components: timer, TIM, and relay 2, R2. The 
external output OUT1 of the TIM connects to input IN2 of contacts 2, C2, which is in 
circuits 1 and 2 but not 4. Since there is current in circuit 4 rows 1, 3 and 5 of the 
decision table for the timer are considered (row 4 is not considered as initially the 
timer was closed and hence it cannot be in a FO state), see Table 4. Row 1 is 
considered first, this gives OUT1 = CL, which coincides with the initial state for this 
output. As this results in no change to the system rule 3 is applied. Hence the third 
row of Table 4 is considered next. However, this also gives OUT1 = CL and therefore 
row 5 is considered. In this case the value of OUT1 doesn’t matter and hence is not 
relevant. As there are no rows left in Table 4 with IN = C, the algorithm searches for 
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any added functions for this component, by rule 3. There is one added function but the 
conditions for it are not satisfied and hence the next component that is considered is 
R2. A decision box 4 is created which relates to the entry of OUT1 in Table 3 (same 
as for R1), see Figure 5a. 
 
Step 6: As the two circuits containing S, circuits 2 and 4, have now been considered 
the decision table for S, Table 2, is checked to see if there are any functions which can 
be applied. In this case function (2) needs to be considered. A decision box is created 
related to the switch, as IN1 = CL and Time = 0.1 min, from earlier. The only 
unknown condition is its state (either W or FC, see Table 2). Thus the decision box 4 
in Figure 5a asks “Is S: OUT => NC?”. Therefore, following the YES branch, from 
the decision table it can be seen that the switch works and consequently after           
0.1 minutes opens. 
 
Now all components with external output and functions in circuits 2 and 4 have been 
investigated. The construction algorithm proceeds by reconsidering the components 
with external output, R1, TIM and R2, and the components to which their external 
outputs are linked are investigated. Considering initially R1, as OUT1 is connected to 
IN2 of C1, these contacts, and therefore circuits 1 and 3, are considered next in turn. 
 
Steps 3, 4 and 5 are then repeated for this component. The component to which the 
external output of TIM is connected is then considered etc., until a stopping criteria is 
reached, i.e. all the components which could change their outputs have been 
considered. This occurs, on the YES branches, after decision box 10, see Figure 5a. 
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Step 7: A consequence box is created showing the state of the system which in this 
case is that the tank indicates high pressure, T: OUT = HPR. 
 
Step 8: The rest of the CCD is obtained in the same manner by back tracking to the 
last decision box and developing the NO branch until the cause-consequence diagram 
is complete.  
 
iii) Diagram reduction: The cause-consequence diagram presented in Figures 5a, b is 
in its reduced form.  
 
iv) Development of the fault trees: Fault trees, shown in Figure 6, are now created 
using previously developed methods, see [4] for each decision box.  
 
v) Analysis: The final cause-consequence diagram for the pressure tank system, 
Figure 3, is presented in Figures 5a, b with the corresponding fault trees in Figure 6. 
The diagram is in a form where each path contains independent events in the decision 
boxes and can be quantified with ease. 
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Fig. 5a Cause-consequence diagram for pressure tank system 
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Fig. 5b Cause-consequence diagram for pressure tank system (continued) 
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Fig. 6 Fault trees for the CCD shown in Figures 5a, b. 
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3.2 Qualitative analysis 
For the example considered the failure event is very high pressure in the tank, i.e. the 
consequence “T: OUT = VHPR”. In the diagram there are eight consequence boxes 
with this outcome, these are numbered 1-8 on Figures 5a, b. To obtain the minimal cut 
sets the failure events leading to these boxes must be traced. For example, for the 
consequence box 1 on the NO branch of decision box 10 the component failures 
leading to this are given from Ft10, i.e. R2_FC. Considering the other consequence 
boxes in the same manner and disregarding any non-minimal contributions, leads to 
the complete list of minimal cut sets:  
{R2_FC}, {PRS_FC, R1_FC}, {PRS_FC, TIM_FC}, {S_FC, PRS_FC}. 
 
3.3 Quantitative Analysis 
Considering the paths of the CCD leading to VHPR the probability of the system 
failing and producing very high pressure can be obtained. There are 8 such mutually 
exclusive paths. The first one leading to the consequence “T: OUT = VHPR”, 
numbered 1 on the diagram, is: YES branches of decision boxes 1-9 and NO branch 
of decision box 10. The probability of the YES branch of decision box 1 is ( )11 Ftq−  
etc. Hence the probability of path 1 is given by: 
( )( )( )( )( )( )( )
( )( ) 1098
7654321
11
1111111
FtFtFt
FtFtFtFtFtFtFt
qqq
qqqqqqq  1) P(Path
−−⋅
⋅−−−−−−−=
 
where 1Ftq  is the probability of the top event of fault tree 1 etc. Using the fault trees 
shown in Figure 6 this can be written in terms of the basic events as: 
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
( )( )( ) FCRFCPRSFTFP
FMFPSFFSFPSFFSFCS
FORFORFPSFOSFPSFOS
qqqq
qqqqqq
qqqqqq  1) P(Path
_2___
__2__2__
_2_1_1__1_
111
111
111
−−−⋅
⋅−+−−−⋅
⋅−−+−−=
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where FOSq _  is the probability of the switch failing open etc. The probabilities of the 
other paths are obtained in the same manner. Assuming that the pressure tank 
becomes empty after 12 hours, the probability of failure for revealed failures is 
obtained using Equation 1 with hours t 12= : 
 tq λ−−= e1 .        (1) 
For unrevealed failures the probability of failure is obtained using θ  and τ , given 
Equation 2:  
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅= τθλ
2
q .       (2) 
The probability of VHPR is obtained by summing the probabilities of all of these 
paths. Therefore: 
( ) ( )∑
=
Ρ=Ρ
8
1i
i Pathtank the in pressure highVery .   (3) 
Using the data given in Table 1 and Equations 1-3 the probability of very high 
pressure in the tank is found to be 6100871.8 −⋅ . This is the same result as would be 
obtained by taking the four minimal cut sets listed earlier and using the inclusion-
exclusion expansion [8]. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
An algorithm to automatically construct cause-consequence diagrams is developed in 
this paper. From an initial description of a system the algorithm develops the CCD in 
a logical manner. Such an automatic construction saves an analyst from a laborious 
and time consuming task and ensures that all possible system behaviour is modelled. 
The diagram generated can be quantified simply to give exact probabilities of all 
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system outcomes considered. The algorithm employs topology diagrams and decision 
tables, methods developed previously for fault tree construction. 
 
In order to demonstrate the algorithm a pressure tank example has been considered 
here, however the algorithm has been tested with other substantial industrial 
examples. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table Captions 
Table 1 Failure modes and failure data for the components 
Table 2 Decision table for switch 
Table 3 Decision table for relay 
Table 4 Decision table for timer 
Table 5 Decision table for power supply 
Table 6 Decision table for fuse 
Table 7 Decision table for motor 
Table 8 Decision table for pump 
Table 9 Decision table for tank 
Table 10 Decision table for pressure switch 
Table 11 Decision table for contacts 
Table 12 Decision table for junctions 
 
Figure captions 
Fig. 1a Flowchart showing the main steps in the diagram construction for systems 
containing circuits 
Fig. 1b Flowchart showing the main steps in the diagram construction for systems 
without circuits 
Fig. 2 Cause-consequence diagram reduction 
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Fig. 3 Pressure tank system 
Fig. 4 Topology diagram for the pressure tank system 
Fig. 5a Cause-consequence diagram for pressure tank system 
Fig. 5b Cause-consequence diagram for pressure tank system (continued) 
Fig. 6 Fault trees for the CCD shown in Figures 5a, b 
 
Notation 
CCD  cause-consequence diagram 
q   failure probability 
λ   failure rate 
θ   inspection interval 
τ   mean time to repair 
 
